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Abstract 
This paper uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to study the relationship 
between health status and economic welfare at household level. We develop a model to 
estimate the welfare cost of ill health by exploiting the methodology of the equivalence scales. 
The crucial variables in this approach are, besides the health status (measured in several 
dimensions), the economic decisions of the household which can be directly related to health 
conditions, such as health-related expenses. By estimating a demand system we derive health-
equivalence scales to learn about the cost of health conditions on economic welfare, 
controlling for other covariates. Our estimates suggest that – when taking account of health – 
the welfare of households in poor health drops substantially and  inequality increases. There 
are important social welfare costs associated with differences in the health status of the elderly 
in the USA. 
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 1. Introduction 
This paper uses the HRS (Health and Retirement Study) to examine the 
relationship between health status and economic welfare at  the household 
level. The terminology and the intuition go along the lines developed by the 
equivalence scale literature: while in that case the focus is on the welfare 
cost brought about by the presence of children,  and more generally 
demographics, we develop a model to estimate the welfare cost of coping 
with poor health.  
To this end we exploit several dimensions of households behavior  available 
in the HRS, which investigates different aspects of life for the ageing 
population in the USA. A recent novelty of this survey is that, along with 
the traditional health and socio-economic variables (CORE questionnaire), a 
number of variables providing information on expenditures on various items 
are also collected in a supplement (CAMS).  
We cannot document paths to poverty and bad health and we cannot 
investigate the direction of causality between health and economic welfare 
(Smith, 1999 and 2002; Adda, Banks and von Gaudecker, 2005), because 
we do not have enough waves of the data or even data linking parents and 
children (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002), which would allow us to 
identify some of the relevant structural parameters of this relationship. 
Hence we focus the attention on the cross sectional distribution of  welfare 
in the sample as determined by health conditions, exploiting  the (short) 
panel nature of the data.  
The first part of the paper is devoted to methodological issues as well as  to  
the definition  of  “health outcomes” and to the ongoing debate on health 
inequality (Skinner and Zhou, 2004). The link between economic 
performance and health outcomes can be investigated by making use  of the 
actual survival of individuals (Deaton , 2001) or of various indexes of health 
conditions (Currie and Madrian, 1999, Smith 1999 and 2002, Skinner and 
Zhou, 2004). The HRS offers a wide variety of health measures including 
the subjective self-reported health status.    
The theoretical model clarifies how health enters the indirect utility function  
of the household and allows us to choose an actual measure of health which 
can be assigned to each household.  As for economic welfare we will follow 
the tradition that recognizes income (total expenditure)  as a starting point in 
the measurement of well being. However,  household welfare indicators 
have to account for differences in demographic composition and health 
conditions. Therefore we derive an ‘equivalent income’ measure of well-
being based on economic decisions of the household, which can be directly 
related to health conditions, such as health-related expenses. 
Our data set contains information on various expenditure categories and 
medical expenditures, which we  use to estimate a demand system: we argue 
that  these expenditures items, taken jointly, are relevant in revealing the 
effects of health on welfare.  The focus of the paper is the measurement of 
the indirect effects of  ill-health on utility implied by changes in the 
structure of the cost function, hence we neglect any direct impact that 
different health conditions may have on well-being. 
Section 2 contains both the main set up of the model, where household 
health conditions are used to derive an equivalent household income, and 
some elements of the empirical implementation. Section 3 discusses 
measurement issues and provides a brief description of the data, focusing 
the attention on the variables of interest: health status and expenditure 
measures. Section 4 presents the econometric estimates of  health-related 
equivalence scales, Section 5  shows the implied equivalent incomes and it 
discusses the results in terms of inequality. Section 6 draws some 
conclusions.  
 
2. Health Inequality and Health Equivalence Scales- HES 
There is a rich literature based on the relationship between health and 
economic behaviour,  investigating the well known “health-income 
gradient”, but, to our knowledge, only  few contributions exist on the 
welfare costs of poor health conditions1.  
The theoretical background  is based on the notion that, at a micro level, 
health enters the utility function of individuals, e.g. in the form of a stock2. 
Models based on the “health-as-a-stock” assumption derive dynamic 
conditions that can be analyzed and tested in a dynamic context: the 
identifying strategy often hinges on unexpected shocks to health that affect 
life cycle variables.  One might need in this case a very long history of 
health events dating back to childhood  (Case, Lubotsky  and Paxson, 2002; 
Smith, 2002),  in order to test for causality it would be necessary also to 
specify the full joint data generating process for income and health (Adda, 
Banks and von Gaudecker, 2005)3. 
In a broader health economics perspective, several authors have addressed 
the issue of “effectiveness”, i.e. how much health care spending is reflect in 
better health outcomes, particularly in the USA. One strand of this literature 
has looked at a more specific question:  which groups in the population 
account for the bulk of health care spending in a country? If  it is high 
income people, or more educated people,  the evidence would point to 
relevant socio economic disparities, which cannot be mitigated by 
increasing health care spending4.   
The ongoing debate on the relationship between  inequality in health care 
expenditures  and inequality in health outcomes (and their relative strength) 
obviously involves studying carefully expenditure data, the utilization of 
                                                     
1 See Wagstaff (1986 and 1991) and  Williams (1997).  Currie and Madrian 
(1999) provide a survey in this area of research, relating to labor supply 
decisions. 
2 Grossman (1972a and 1972b). 
3 Adda, Banks and von Gaudecker, 2005, provide a complete set up for 
testing the assumption that positive income innovations relate to health 
improvements in cohort data.  
4 See for example Le Grand (1978, 1982), Le Grand et. al. (2001),  Lee, 
McClellan and Skinner (2004) and Battacharya and Lakdawalla (2004).     
effective health care and its quality (Baicker and Chandra, 2004;  Skinner 
and Zhou, 2004).  
In this paper we focus on a micro level investigation based on a short panel 
of households (Health and Retirement Study 2001 and 2003) and we 
contribute to one aspect of this debate, by providing fresh evidence on the 
health-income gradient based on consumption behaviour. On the basis of 
our data we cannot say if the effect of ill-health on welfare can be explained 
by a lack of access to care, forcing the household to bear out-of-pocket 
expenses, we can however provide a coherent set of estimates of 
expenditure decisions (including expenditure on health goods), conditional 
on health outcomes.  From these we can infer the “true” cost of health for 
the sample under investigation. 
In line with this approach it is appropriate to assume a static one-period 
decision model where, in principle, household welfare derives from both the 
utility of  health and the utility of consumption.  However, we do not 
attempt to separately identify the direct effect of health on utility, rather our 
model is based on a health-conditional cost function, from which we obtain 
in turn a health-deflated level of household income. In this respect the 
derivation of the demand for different commodities – including health-
related goods – follows the two-stage budgeting approach and it is 
conditional on life cycle variables. In other words we measure the effects of 
ill-health on the marginal valuation of the different commodities entering a 
given basket.  
From an empirical point of view, the concern for the endogeneity issue, i.e. 
for the fact that an underlying factor – say socio-economic status – jointly 
determines resources and health, is also mitigated by the fact that our health 
measures are obtained from the HRS-CORE questionnaire, which is 
collected one year before the HRS-CAMS, where the expenditure items are 
collected. Hence health can be regarded as pre-determined vis-à-vis 
expenditure choices.  
 
In order to explain how we estimate the relationship between health and 
welfare we need to specify the underlying consumer’s problem.  Suppose 
that each household h is characterised by a utility function defined over  
household economic welfare index ( Ehy ), where 
E
hy will be specified as 
“equivalent income” in what follows. By assuming a standard specification 
of the utility function, the household welfare is:  
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E
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Household economic welfare could depend on household demographics 
(ah),  on household income (yh), on commodity prices and on health status. 
The household economic welfare index Ehy ,  is then obtained by rescaling 
the actual monetary measure of income (yh) by a scale which accounts for 
household characteristics s(ah) and by a scale of the health of each 
household s(Hh), so that: 
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Note that the two scales are assumed to be separable and therefore we 
simply take the product of the two. Suppose that the expenditure function yh 
= c(vh, p, ah, Hh) is defined by a demand system AIDS5,i.e.: 
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where  p = [pi, i=1,…,N] is the vector of prices of commodities which have 
been purchased. The two functions can be further specified as: 
 
                                                     
5 Almost Ideal Demand System, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 1980b). 
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Note that the scale-terms only enter the function A. 
We define the equivalence scales as : 
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where ah = [amh, m=1,…,M] is the vector of household characteristics amh 
for the household h (e.g..: gender of the head of the household, age of the 
head of the household, geographical location, etc..), and: 
 (7) ∑
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where  Hh = [Hlh, l=1,…,L] is the vector of health outcomes  Hlh  for 
household  h. 
By taking the derivatives of equation (7) with respect to  ln pi we obtain the 
budget share for the i-th commodity: 
(8)
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where  Ph=A(p,ah,Hh) is again an aggregate price index of relative prices 
for household h. 
Not that in  the estimation we can only obtain values for the combined 
coefficients:  
 
(9) mimimi λβλθ −=  
(10) liliil λβλπ −=  
as functions of household’s demographic characteristics amh and health 
characteristics Hlh. Therefore the estimation of the budget shares as 
described in (8) does not directly deliver specific scales for each 
demographic characteristic or health outcome, but a combination of 
parameters. However, we could add a second stage to the estimation on the 
basis of the following idea. If the terms miλ   and  liλ  in (9) and (10) are 
regarded as zero-sum deviations  from the general equivalence scale (i.e. the 
parameters mλ   and lλ ) , then the latter can be retrieved once we know the 
estimates for  the parameters miθ , liπ  and iβ 6. 
The actual implementation of the estimation procedure starting form 
equation (8) requires knowledge of the price vector. Although we use the 
CPI  for the seven consumption categories defined above to obtain real 
expenditures, the time variation of prices does not allow us to separately 
identify price elasticities7 .  If we apply the conventional normalization 
carried out in cross sectional data, such that  pi=1 and  lnpi=0, the  budget 
shares of interest are : 
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In this case we can show that by construction the general scales s(ah) 
behaves as an equivalence scale with respect to characteristics ah, for a 
given health status.  
In fact we can take the ratio:  
                                                     
6 See also Patrizii and Rossi (1991). Note however that the “regressions” 
(10) and (11) cannot be implemented through an OLS procedure as residuals 
are non independent, therefore we resort to a GLS procedure in the 
parameter space. 
7 Price indexes vary across regional areas and expenditure categories, but we 
have only one time lag between 2001 and 2003. 
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where we  normalize in such a way that the scale takes value one for the 
reference household 1)( =Ras . 
Most interesting for our exercise, given ah, s(Hh) behaves as an equivalence 
scale based on health conditions, because:  
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where we normalize so that 1)( =RHs  for the reference health level. It is 
useful in our context to define HR as the maximum value that the health 
indicator can take, such that  s(Hmax)=1 when health is “excellent”. 
The combined equivalence scale for a generic household h depends on both 
scales as follows: 
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3. The relationship between health and expenditure on health-
goods  
This paper uses the HRS (Health and Retirement Study). The HRS is a 
biennial panel starting in 1992, in the year 2000 it covered cohorts of 1947 
or earlier, with approximately 20000 subjects aged 50 and over. The CAMS 
were conducted in 2001 and 2003 (between CORE surveys), for the 2001 
CAMS questionnaire were sent to 5000 people drawn from HRS 2000, in 
2003 they were sent to 4156 of the respondents of 2001. Due to death and 
other attrition problems the 2003-CAMS early release contains 3254 
respondents which we linked to the 2001 respondents.  A detailed 
description of this supplement can be found in Hurd and Rohwedder (2005) 
and in RAND (2005). We focus on the consumption section of the 
supplement, the most knowledgeable person in the household is asked about 
spending of the household: there are 32 consumption categories recorded, 
we only make use of spending on 26 non-durable items.  Also, we group 
finer categories into broader categories as follows: 
- Free time spending (trips, vacation, entertainment, hobbies etc..) 
- Clothing 
- Food (in and out) 
- Transportation and vehicle services (including gasoline) 
- Home repairs and maintenance – household items (including rent) 
- Health related expenditures (out of pocket expenses on drugs, 
medications, health services, medical supply etc.., not covered by 
insurance) 
- Housing services (including utilities such as electricity, water 
charges etc..) 
Table 1 shows the average and standard deviation of the budget shares of 
these expenditure items in 2001 and 2003 together (in real terms). Some 
households report expenditures on one consumption category only, these 
observations are not informative for our analysis and we prefer to include 
only households who have at least two non-zero expenditure items in their 
budget8. Table 1 clearly shows that health-related expenditures are a 
substantial fraction of household’s budget, the estimated mean share is 
higher than the one observed for clothing and for transportation: a spending 
pattern which is not surprising for this age group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 We excluded 411 observations through this selection. 
Table 1 Mean Budget Share in the HRS (CAMS) 2001 and 2003 
Budget Share Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation
health goods 0.1218 0.1405 
food 0.1680 0.1596 
house services 0.2158 0.1701 
other house expenses 0.2613 0.2390 
free time 0.0969 0.1273 
clothing 0.0573 0.0749 
transportation 0.0785 0.0956 
 
As for the health measure,  the HRS has  information on subjective as well 
as objective (self-reported) health measures. The former is the usual “how 
are you?”9 question while the latter involves questions  – in several 
dimensions – which record the ability to perform activities (climbing stairs, 
walking etc..) and current illnesses or health problems (hart and lung 
conditions etc..). Furthermore we can rely on questions concerning 
disability10,  although these may not correspond to actual physical disability, 
but only to an economic condition (collecting the benefit), they do provide 
some valuable information about the overall health condition of the 
respondent.  In the empirical analysis we make use of three main health 
indicators, all recorded at  individual level: 
(1) Subjective health,   the scale goes from 1 (excellent) to 5 (very 
poor), we rescale the coding  between 1 and 0; 
(2) Activities of Daily Living, particularly ADL3, which looks at three 
main abilities (dressing, bathing and eating). The index ranges 
between 0 (no limitations) and 3 (inability to perform all three 
activities); 
(3) Self-reported disabled.  
The following Table 2 shows the distribution of the self-reported subjective 
health condition, while Table 3 shows the distribution of  ADL3 .  
                                                     
9 “Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” 
10 In the year 2000 question (H00G_R) and in  2002 (H02J_R), both from 
the CORE. 
TABLE 2. Distribution of self-reported subjective health status 
Subjective health  
Index 
CORE
 2000 
  % 
CORE
2002 
  % 
CAMS 
2001 
  % 
CAMS 
2003 
  % 
poor           (0.00)  9.52  9.19  6.73  5.71 
fair            (0.25) 18.81 19.92 17.26 17.68 
good          (0.50) 30.16 31.61 29.91 31.77 
very good  (0.75) 28.88 27.99 31.77 32.02 
excellent  (1.00) 12.64 11.29 14.33 12.82 
     
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Number of observations 19572 18156 5811 5062 
 
 
TABLE 3: Distribution of ADL3  
ADL3 Index 2000 2002 2001 2003 
     
           0 85.89 85.83 90.19 90.30 
          1  7.93  7.66  6.71  6.16 
          2  3.74  3.99  2.39  2.75 
          3  2.44  2.53  0.71  0.79 
     
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
number of observations 19554 18167 5812 5063 
 
While the health measure is available at the individual level, expenditure 
and therefore welfare, are reported at household level. Hence we need to 
define an health indicator for the household. Let  Hhc represent the 
subjective health of  the individual C in  household h (with c=1, …, C), it 
can be aggregated at the household level on the basis of a ‘selfish-
behaviour’ assumption, i.e. by simply taking the average of individuals’ 
health: 
(16) ∑
=
=Γ
C
c
hc
h H
H
C 1 max
1  
where Hmax represents the maximum level of health (i.e. someone in 
excellent health conditions). For example, in our data this corresponds to the 
value one. It is clear that the ‘selfish’ attitude is due to orthogonality 
between the contribution of one’s health on total health and the level of 
health of relatives in the household:  
 (17) 
max
1
CHHhc
h =∂
Γ∂  
The geometric mean exhibits a more ‘altruistic’ attitude,  however in this 
paper we are mainly concerned with the overall effect on expenditure 
decisions rather than capturing the cross effects of the composition of health 
within the household, therefore we opt for  the arithmetic mean.  
Since the main point of the paper is to exploit the differences in the cost of 
“health-goods” in relation to the health conditions of the household, we 
motivate this study by first looking at the patterns of these covariates in the 
data. In the CAMS sample about ten percent of the households do not report 
any health expenditures,  Table 4 shows the percentage distribution of 
households with zero  health expenditures by aggregated household health 
status.  
 
Table 4. Distribution of households with zero health expenditures 
 
Aggregated household  
health index 
( within household mean) 
Percentage with No  
Health 
Expenditure 
  
0.000 18.02 
0.125 18.52 
0.250 13.64 
0.375 6.82 
0.500 9.50 
0.625 4.48 
0.750 7.84 
0.875 7.51 
1.000 12.93 
  
Total 9.51 
 
This percentage is higher for households in “poor health” which seems 
puzzling at first:  there are several explanations for this evidence, including 
the possibility that although there are positive health expenditures these are 
fully covered by insurance11.   In any event,  mean and median budget 
shares of health costs are higher for households in poor health, when taking 
moments  both conditional and unconditional on spending on health-goods.  
 
Table 5. Mean and Median Budget Share on Health Goods by Health 
Status 
aggregated 
health 
index12 
unconditional 
median 
unconditional 
mean 
conditional 
median 
conditional 
mean 
 <0.40 0.091 0.151 0.114 0.174 
 ≥0.40 and 
<0.70 
0.083 0.128 0.093 0.139 
≥0.70 0.058 0.099 0.066 0.109 
 
Spending patterns on health-related goods are obviously affected by the 
existence of insurance coverage. In the HRS sample (individuals aged 50 
and over) enrolment in Medicare is clearly relevant both for part A and for 
part B (57% in the year 2000 participate to Medicare A, 95%  of these 
individuals is also covered by Medicare B). As for Medicaid approximately 
8% of individuals is covered (mostly women, presumably dependent wives). 
A residual fraction of the sample is covered by other insurances.  However 
participation to these plans does not drive to zero out-of-pocket health 
expenditures, also because many covered goods and services imply a 
substantial co-payment.   
The stylized fact that this brief description highlights is that households in 
“poor health” spend a substantially higher proportion of their budget in 
health-related goods.  We are confident that we can rule out a potential 
                                                     
11 For example through Medicare or Medicaid.  
12 For simplicity we have combined the nine categories of the aggregate health index into 
three main brackets on the basis of the density over these categories. 
alternative explanation, i.e. that households which self- report poor health 
conditions are not objectively unhealthy, but, simply because of their 
perception, they will be spending more than the average on health-
commodities. I.e. one might argue that preferences and pessimism drive 
both the answer to subjective health conditions and to health-related 
expenditures. A simple Ordered Probit analysis of the subjective health 
index on other self-reported objective measures (blood pressure, hart 
condition etc..) shows a high predictive power of the battery of objective 
variables13. Hence subjective health conditions determine health-related 
expenditures largely on the basis of actual needs and not just on the basis of 
different preferences.  
Furthermore, one could argue that, since health typically correlates with 
income (the well known socio-economic conditions –SES- gradient, Smith 
2002) the differences described above are the result of the underlying 
income distribution. However a simple non parametric regression of the 
health budget share on total expenditure shows that the Engel curve is 
essentially flat, apart from the tails of the distribution (Figure 1). Hence the 
relationship of these expenditures to income cannot completely drive the 
correlation of health outcomes and the “health” budget share. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 Results are available from the authors upon request.   
Figure 1. Non parametric Engel curve of the “health-commodities” 
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0
.1
.2
.3
.4
6 8 10 12 14
log total expenditure
lower bound upper bound
mean
 
 
 
4. Empirical set up  and results 
The definition of budget shares provided in equation (13) above can be used 
to estimate equivalence scales in our data. The budget share of household  h 
is defined over its characteristics (or characteristics of the head of the 
household – such as age, or aggregation of characteristics - such as ADL).  
We restrict ourselves to households with one or two-persons,  because 
different family compositions may imply a complex combination of health 
outcomes, demographics, resources and consumption behaviour14.  As we 
mentioned in Section 3 we select households with non-zero expenditures on  
at least two categories, the final estimation sample is described in Table A1 
in the Appendix.   
Demand system equations require to be simultaneously estimated: we make 
use of a 3SLS procedure where the set of explanatory variables is identical 
in all equations and it includes age of the head, gender of the head, 
                                                     
14 We also exclude a few households with missing subjective health status. 
educational dummies and occupational dummies, the existence of health 
insurance,  health-related variables and regional dummies15.      
The reason to resort to 3SLS is because we treat total expenditure as an 
endogenous variable and we  instrument total expenditure by a number of 
instruments including income and dummies for different types of income 
(see Blundell, Pashardes and Weber, 1993).  In order to capture the effects 
of health on budget shares we use as controls also risk factors such as 
smoking and drinking habits, in fact inequality may result simply from 
differences in healthy living. Furthermore we control for the presence of 
medical insurance by introducing a dummy if participating Medicare, a 
dummy for Medicaid and a dummy for other Medical Insurances. In this set 
up the reference categories of dummy variables (or discrete variables) are 
relevant to construct equivalent incomes, in particular for health the 
reference category is  Hmax (household health-level index  between 0.7 and 
1). For the other variables we choose a household whose members are 
couple, all members have secondary education and all members are in 
dependent employment. 
Since we are dealing with panel data, observations will not be independent; 
hence we use a between-transformation in order to exploit the cross 
sectional variability of interest (for example differences in demographics 
between households which are fixed over time). It should be recalled that 
subjective health indexes and ADL measures refer to the CORE-
questionnaire of the year prior to the expenditure decision and therefore are 
predetermined in our regressions.  
Results are presented in Table 6, where each column refers to one 
consumption category and the rows refer to selected explanatory variables16.  
                                                     
15 Most dummies are defined as to show whether the relevant characteristic applies to one 
member of the household (e.g. low education_1) or to both members (e.g. low 
education_2). 
16 One consumption category (house expenditures) is omitted because, due to the adding-up 
restrictions, estimates of the parameters are automatically determined. Explanatory 
variables include occupational dummies, regional dummies etc…not shown for brevity.     
Log-real-expenditure has a  negligible effect on the health-share, which 
suggest that this commodity is neither a necessity nor a luxury. This is line 
with what found in Figure 1, once we properly take account of the complete 
set of consumption  decisions and of demographics, there is basically no 
relationship of health-related out-of-pocket expenditures to income.  One 
could argue that the lack of correlation is totally due to the existence of 
medical insurance: however we already pointed out that people covered by 
Medicare might have to face substantial out-of-pocket expenses. Indeed of 
the insurance dummy variables included in the regression only Medicaid has 
a negative significant effect on the budget of health commodities.  
In the “health-equation”, the subjective-health aggregate index  has a 
significant positive effect: those who report poor health conditions tend to 
spend more on health related commodities.  
Other variables have a minor role in the medical expenses equation, apart 
from age (positive effect), the ADL3 dummies (positive effect) and drinking 
habits (negative effect).  Interesting enough in our demand system 
educational dummies have a significant effect only on housing services and 
“free-time” expenditures, not on the health-budget share, hence our 
simultaneous equation system (controlling for health) does not lend support 
to the view that more educated people account for the larger fraction of 
health spending in the USA17. However it should be pointed out that the 
HRS sample looks at a selected group of the population, which may be not 
representative of the overall spending pattern of the American population 
and also has important differences in terms of educational attainments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 See the discussion in Skinner and Zhou (2004) and Battacharya and Lakdawalla (2004) 
Table 6 Estimates of the demand system on HRS-CAMS  2001 and 2003.  
Based on between estimator 3SLS 
(Selected explanatory variables – standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 Health 
Goods 
Food  House 
Services 
Free 
Time 
Goods 
Clothing Transport 
Log of Real 
Total 
Expenditure 
-0.007 
(0.027) 
-0.022 
(0.027) 
-0.007 
(0.033) 
0.101 
(0.028) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
Age 0.149 
(0.028) 
0.030 
(0.028) 
-0.063 
(0.033) 
-0.141 
(0.029) 
-0.037 
(0.033) 
-0.052 
(0.018) 
Head is Male -0.010 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.003) 
One member 
has low 
education 
0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
 0.024 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
 -0.004 
(0.004) 
 -0.006 
(0.005) 
Both members 
have low 
education 
-0.033 
(0.019) 
-0.007 
(0.019) 
-0.030 
(0.023) 
-0.012 
(0.019) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
0.050 
(0.012) 
 One member 
is disabled 
0.018 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
 0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
 -0.001 
(0.006) 
 -0.011 
(0.007) 
 Both 
members are 
disabled 
0.009 
(0.033) 
-0.057 
(0.033) 
 0.065 
(0.039) 
 0.031 
(0.033) 
 -0.014 
(0.018) 
 0.016 
(0.022) 
Subjective 
health  
“poor health” 
0.046 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.052 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
Subjective 
health  
“fair health” 
0.025 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.027 
(0.007) 
-0.022 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
One or both 
members with 
no more than 
one ADL3 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.0006 
(0.009) 
0.003  
(0.011) 
-0.011  
(0.009) 
-0.007  
(0.005) 
-0.004  
(0.006) 
One or both 
members with  
more than one 
ADL3 
0.060 
(0.011) 
-0.019 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.031 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
Medicare 
dummy 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.0001 
(0.007) 
0.006  
(0.009) 
0.004  
(0.007) 
-0.002  
(0.004) 
-0.011  
(0.005) 
Medicaid 
dummy 
-0.087 
(0.015) 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
0.044 
(0.019) 
0.038 
(0.016) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.018 
(0.010) 
Other 
Insurance 
dummy 
0.022 
(0.008) 
-0.023 
(0.008) 
0.022 
(0.010) 
    -0.015 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.004) 
0.032 
(0.005) 
Smoking -0.011 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.023 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.0009 
(0.004) 
Drinking -0.011 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.014 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.005) 
0.0008 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
 As for regional dummies (not shown) the West-South dummy seem to have 
a positive significant effect  on the health-goods budget share. Although 
these dummies are just controlling for the region of residence, and not 
necessarily reflecting characteristics of  
the system where people receive health care (Skninner and Zhou, 2004), 
when used in a demand system, along with all the other variables, these 
dummies should reflect  the characteristics of  the supply of health care, 
including differences in prices. 
For the other commodities log-real expenditure has the expected sign, in 
particular “free time” is positively related to “income”.  No clear pattern can 
be envisaged for the effect of subjective health  on other commodities, apart 
from “free time activities”, where the effect of ill health is negative. 
Our estimates show a number of interesting facts: out-of-pocket health 
expenses are strongly affected by poor health and conditions (subjective) 
and by the existence of self-reported limitations in daily activities. They are 
not affected by income levels or educational levels or other demographics. 
The other commodity which is strongly affected by health conditions (but 
also by income levels) is spending on “free time goods”. Given the age 
group represented in our sample, this points to important complementarities 
of these two consumption categories in households’ budgets.  
5.  The Implied Equivalence scales and Inequality:  Beyond the Health-
Income Gradient. 
The commodity-specific equivalence scales can be derived ex post, starting 
from the definition provided in equations (4) and (5) and  by following the 
procedure described in equations (9) and (10) above, which applies a GLS 
regression in the parameter space,  once the estimated parameters from the 
budget shares equations are known, hence delivering also a measure of 
dispersion.  
Once we have available health-based equivalence scales these will allow us 
to study several aspects of the effects of health status which are usually 
neglected in analyses of economic welfare. As we argued in the 
introduction, much of the attention in the literature has focused on the direct 
correlation between health and resources (income or wealth), i.e. the health 
income gradient. However it is useful to measure income inequality while 
controlling for health conditions, a simple extension of our econometric 
analysis is to construct equivalent incomes which are based on a coherent 
measure of  the costs of ill health. 
The  health-based equivalent income( at the household level)  is derived by 
making use of the scale based on household subjective health conditions: 
(18)  
)( h
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h Hs
yy =  
This represents the income that household h would need to reach its own 
welfare level (given its own demographic characteristics ah), if that 
household had the health status of the reference household (i.e. the 
maximum health status). If the household does not enjoy excellent health, 
then the equivalence scale is larger than 1 and equivalent income is below 
actual money income: it is as if that household was effectively made poorer 
by a lower health status. A combined equivalent income, defined by 
equation (3) ca be obtained as: 
(19) 
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where the scale based on household demographics is also used.  This is the 
income that household h would need to be as well off as in its current 
situation evaluated at the demographics of the reference household and at 
the ‘excellent health’ status.  
In all these cases equivalent income is a measure of household welfare (a 
positive monotonic transformation of utility).  
A simple comparison of actual income and equivalent income provides 
evidence of the  welfare cost of health. The distribution of this over different 
characteristics (say age) also gives indications of the incidence of these 
costs in different groups of the population. 
For simplicity we only report equivalence scales for some relevant 
dimensions in Table 7. The underlying estimates have been obtained 
through the “between estimator” and by making use of real expenditure.  
Table 7 shows that, other things being equal,  the scale is highest (the 
household is “poorest”) for the worse health conditions and is decreasing 
almost linearly as health conditions get closer to their maximum value (set 
equal to one).   
This is a first important finding of our paper: if we consider two identical 
households in terms of income (with the same total expenditure) but 
different health conditions, our estimates say that the equivalent income of 
the household  in poor health is approximately two thirds of the equivalent 
income of the healthy household. The ADL3 scale also shows a strong 
effect of ill-health on welfare, implying that a relevant “compensation” 
would be needed to provide such a household with the same level of welfare  
as a similar household with no limitations. Age is also playing a very 
important role in assessing differences in welfare: given the spending 
patterns of two otherwise identical households, older households have much 
lower welfare.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 7:  Implied equivalence scales  
(based on between estimator- standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 
  OLS GLS 
Subjective health Poor 1.495 1.621 
(0.334) 
 Fair 1.140 1.267 
(0.141) 
    
Disabled One member disabled 1.046 1.042 
(0.102) 
 Both members disabled 0.661 0.806 
(0.279) 
    
ADL3 One or both members with 
no more than one inability 
1.109 1.129 
(0.077) 
 One or both members with 
more than one inability 
1.289 1.274 
(0.325) 
    
Single-member 
household 
 0.932 0.765 
(0.105) 
Age 60 1 1 
 70 1.246 1.211 
(0.131) 
 80 1.508 1.428 
(0.288) 
 90 1.784 1.653 
(0.469) 
 
Although we do not investigate the origin of these inequalities, for example 
they may be explained by differential access to health care18, our 
methodology correctly captures the impact of different health conditions on 
household’s consumption decisions, controlling for simultaneous 
consumption choices and demographics and provides a money metric 
measure of the welfare loss.  
Furthermore we can build on our results to ask a more general question: for 
each definition of equivalent income, we can compute a standard summary 
statistic of the income distribution, such as the  Atkinson’s index of 
inequality. If inequality increases when income is deflated by the health 
                                                     
18 See also Skinner and Zhou (2004) 
equivalence scale, then on average poorer households are more affected by 
health conditions (they tend to have poor health). In other words an increase 
in inequality can be regarded as a social welfare loss due to poor health. 
To construct an inequality index we start from a isoelastic welfare function: 
(21) ( ) ∑
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where U stands for the individual utility level (which could also be 
“equalised” according to one of the scales described above). For simplicity 
we assume that at the individual level utility is of the simple logarithmic 
form as specified in (1). 
These assumptions allow us to derive an equally distributed equivalent 
income: EDEY ,  which represents  the equivalent income assigned to each 
household, equally across households,  such that the resulting level of total 
welfare is the same as the of level of actual welfare (the latter results from 
the actual income distribution). The income EDEY  is a monotonic 
transformation of the level of social welfare, hence it is the money metric 
representation of the actual level of welfare associated with the distribution 
of the equivalent household incomes. We indicate with Y  the actual mean 
value of the income distribution, i.e. the level of income implied by the 
maximum welfare level which could be achieved given the current 
resources in the economy. The Atkinson’s index of relative inequality is 
then: 
(22) 
Y
YI EDE−= 1  
We can compute the Atkinson’s index for different cases of relevance to us: 
for example we can look at the distribution of equivalent incomes based on 
demographic scales or on health equivalence scales or both.  
 Table 8.  Measures of inequality: equivalent incomes and the Atkinson’s 
index. 
 Max 
possible 
welfare 
Actual 
welfare 
(EDE) 
Mean tot 
expenditure
EDEY  Atkinson 
index 
 Inequality Aversion Parameter is  ε=0 
Household income 3.21 2.84 24.77  17.04 31.10% 
Household 
equivalent income 
(health) 
3.03    2.63 20.71  13.88 32.97% 
Household 
equivalent income 
(age and health) 
2.34 1.91 10.39   6.75 35.07% 
Household 
equivalent income 
(age, health, and 
ADL3) 
2.32 1.89 10.21    6.59 35.42% 
 Inequality Aversion Parameter is  ε=1 
Household income 1.17 1.00 24.77 15.19 38.66%  
Household 
equivalent income 
(health) 
1.11 0.91 20.71 12.09 41.65% 
Household 
equivalent income 
(age and health) 
0.85 0.54 10.39 5.61 45.99% 
Household 
equivalent income 
(age, health, and 
ADL3) 
0.84 0.53 10.21 5.49 46.25%  
Note: mean annual total expenditure in the raw data is $ 21930 (expressed in 2001-$),   
mean expenditures have been normalised by dividing each value by the highest in the 
distribution and then by multiplying by 1000. 
 
 
Table 8 shows an important effect of subjective health and of the combined 
“age and subjective health” variation, this is even more marked accounting 
for the ADL3 variables. These figures reflect the result found above,  that a 
household in poor health would need a substantial compensation to be as 
well off as the reference household, in fact the equally distributed equivalent 
income drops dramatically. This means for example, that for those 
households facing health problems, welfare, measured in money metric 
units, drops by 18 percentage points.    
 
In terms of the overall distribution of welfare, i.e. for the social cost of ill 
health,   the inequality index grows of about two percentage points when we 
account for the equivalence scale, results are quite robust to changes in the 
inequality aversion parameter used in constructing the index (we present 
results only for ε=0 and  ε=1, the index obviously increases when the 
inequality aversion increases) 19. In other words the inequality index signals 
that equivalent incomes are significantly more unequally distributed than 
actual incomes.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper provides estimates of the effect of health on welfare by 
specifying a demand system on HRS data, a sample based on the population 
aged 50 and over in the U.S.A..  We use both the CORE questionnaire 
(mainly for the health variables) and the CAMS questionnaire (for the 
household budget), to cover the years 2001 and 2003. We specify seven 
broad commodities, including “health-expenditure”, food, “free- time 
expenditure” etc...  
Our model adopts the two-stage budgeting approach, so that estimates of the 
demand system parameters are conditional on life cycle variables. 
Furthermore health variables are coded one year before the budget 
information is collected – hence we can argue that health conditions are 
predetermined vis-á-vis  health-expenditure decisions. Our estimates show 
that health expenditures are strongly affected by health conditions: ill health 
is associated with a higher budget share for health related goods, after 
controlling for a number of household characteristics, including age, an 
ADL index, disability, education etc… 
On the basis of these estimates we derive equivalence scales which suggest 
that households in poor health should be “compensated” to reach the same 
                                                     
19 It should be recalled that the index looks at the overall welfare distribution and one 
percentage point change is quite a large effect in this respect. In fact this “income” 
distribution exhibits more inequality if more households in poor health are located at the 
lower tail of the distribution.     
level of welfare as similar households in good health conditions. In 
particular,  a household facing poor health, with the same actual total 
expenditure of a healthy household,  would have an equivalent income 
curtailed of one third because of the “true” cost of health. We obtain a 
money metric measure of this reduction in welfare: “equally distributed 
equivalent” incomes drop of 18 percentage points for households in poor 
health.    
Furthermore calculations of the inequality index based on the equally 
distributed equivalent incomes show a substantial degree of overall welfare 
inequality due to ill health (the Atkinson’s index grows of about two 
percentage points). When coupled with growth in age the same measure 
shows a more marked increase in inequality: older people in poor health 
suffer important disparities when compared with the reference household. 
These findings suggest important social welfare costs of the existing 
differences in health conditions of the elderly population in the USA.    
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Table A1.  Variables used in the regression analysis, mean and 
standard deviation for the years 2001 and 2003 (incomes 
and expenditures are in dollars of the year 2001)  
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. 
Health Goods (Budget Share) 0.1264 0.127 
Food (Budget Share) 0.1686 0.123 
House Services (Budget Share) 0.2112 0.148 
“Free Time” (Budget Share) 0.0998 0.117 
Clothing (Budget Share) 0.0563 0.065 
Transportation (Budget Share) 0.0766 0.079 
Logarithm of Total Real Expenditure 9.6199 0.753 
Households with one member 0.4489 0.492 
Head is Male 0.4649 0.496 
Logarithm of Age of Head 4.2169 0.138 
One Member has low education 0.1193 0.323 
Both Members have low education 0.0155 0.123 
One Member has high education 0.2578 0.436 
Both Members have high education 0.0623 0.241 
One Member is retired 0.5764 0.464 
Both Members are retired 0.1550 0.335 
One Member non employed, but not retired 0.2138 0.382 
Both Members are non employed, but not retired 0.0011 0.029 
One Member is disabled 0.0792 0.256 
Both Members are disabled 0.0081 0.084 
Index for “poor health” 0.2544 0.405 
Index for “fair health” 0.3654 0.426 
One or both members with no more than one ADL3 0.0915 0.253 
One or both members with more than one ADL3 0.0525 0.207 
Head has private health insurance 0.7524 0.396 
Head enrolled in Medicare 0.6776 0.451 
Head enrolled in Medicaid 0.0658 0.238 
Head currently smoker 0.1809 0.374 
Head drinking alcohol 0.5751 0.473 
         (continues)
 VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. 
Middle Atlantic 0.1296 0.333 
East North Central 0.1707 0.373 
West North Central 0.0980 0.295 
South Atlantic 0.2316 0.417 
East South 0.0591 0.234 
West South 0.0821 0.027 
Mountain 0.0543 0.022 
Pacific 0.1185 0.032 
Number of observations 3054  
 
